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Abstract—In order to stimulate secure sensing for Internet
of Things (IoT) applications such as healthcare and traffic
monitoring, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) systems have to address
security threats, such as jamming, spoofing and faked sensing
attacks, during both the sensing and the information exchange
processes in large-scale dynamic and heterogenous networks.
In this article, we investigate secure mobile crowdsensing and
present how to use deep learning (DL) methods such as stacked
autoencoder (SAE), deep neural network (DNN), and convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) to improve the MCS security
approaches including authentication, privacy protection, faked
sensing countermeasures, intrusion detection and anti-jamming
transmissions in MCS. We discuss the performance gain of
these DL-based approaches compared with traditional security
schemes and identify the challenges that need to be addressed to
implement them in practical MCS systems.
Index Terms—Mobile crowdsensing, security, deep learning,
intrusion detection, faked sensing.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) applies embedded sensors
such as gyroscope, accelerometer, microphone and global po-
sitioning system (GPS) in mobile devices such as smartphones
to provide location-based services for Internet of Things (IoT)
applications including traffic monitoring, healthcare, catering
recommendation, location service and social networks [1].
Participants recruited by an MCS platform monitor the sur-
rounding features and upload the sensing reports to MCS
servers that in turn extract interest information from the sens-
ing reports. Security and privacy are critical for MCS systems,
as mobile devices are controlled by selfish and autonomous
users who can launch insider attacks such as faked sensing
attacks and have privacy concerns, and the transmission over
radio networks such as 3G/4G, WiFi and vehicular ad-hoc
networks (VANETs) are vulnerable to security threats such as
jamming, distributed denial of service attacks (DoS), spoofing
attacks, Sybil attacks, faked sensing attacks and smart attacks
[2].
In this article, we investigate the security and privacy
challenges of mobile crowdsensing, such as sensitive data
leakage and faked sensing attacks, and review the MCS
security solutions such as authentication, malware detection
and data anonymization to protect user privacy and enhance
sensing accuracy in heterogenous dynamic MCS systems. It is
challenging to design and implement these security solutions
in practical MCS systems due to the difficulty in estimating
the mobile user mobility and sensing model in dynamic and
heterogenous networks with insider attackers and dynamic
network traffic.
Deep learning (DL) techniques have received significant
research attentions in speech recognition, computer vision
and network security. By applying DL techniques, the large
network state space and extensive training data can be com-
pressed to accelerate the learning speed, optimize the feature
extraction, and address the “high-dimensional disaster” [3]. In
recent years, the proposed DL-based security schemes such
as the privacy protection scheme, the authentication scheme,
and the malware detection scheme exceed the benchmark
deterministic schemes [4], [5]. In this article, we focus on
the MCS security techniques based on deep learning, such
as stacked auto-encoder (SAE), deep neural network (DNN),
convolutional neural network (CNN), recursive neural network
(RNN), deep belief networks (DBN) and deep boltzmann
machine (DBM).
We focus on the DL-based authentication, privacy pro-
tection, faked sensing countermeasures, intrusion detection,
and anti-jamming transmissions in MCS. The performance
gain of these DL-based approaches compared with traditional
security schemes is presented, showing that deep learning
techniques can accelerate the malware detection speed, en-
hance authentication accuracy, protect data privacy, reduce
the faked sensing attack rate, and resist jamming attacks in
sensing report transmissions. We discuss the challenges and
identify future directions to implement the DL-based security
approaches in practical MCS systems, such as the real-time
security process, accurate evaluation of the MCS utility and
the backup security solutions.
This article is organized as follow. In the next section we
review the MCS attack models. We then describe the DL-based
authentication, privacy protection, faked sensing countermea-
sures, intrusion detection, and anti-jamming transmissions.
Finally, we identify possible directions of future work.
THREAT MODEL IN MOBILE CROWDSENSING
Malicious attackers in MCS aim to degrade the MCS service
levels, crash the MCS system, or steal the privacy data. MCS
systems are also vulnerable to insider attacks launched by
selfish mobile users whose goal is to obtain more payments
and secrets with less sensing costs and privacy leakage risks.
Smart attackers use machine learning techniques and smart
radio devices to choose the attack policy and throw more
dangerous threats to MCS systems. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
mobile crowdsensing systems have to address stealthy and
insider attacks launched by both selfish mobile users and
malicious attackers during the data sensing and information
exchange processes to guarantee the veracity and security of
multiple MCS applications. We briefly review some significant
types of threats in MCS as follows.
Spoofing: A spoofer uses the identity of another mobile
device, a base station (BS) or an access point (AP) to obtain
2Fig. 1. Threats in mobile crowdsensing systems during the data sensing and information exchange processes.
illegal access of the MCS system, and further launch other
attacks, such as man-in-the-middle and DoS attacks [4].
Sybil: A Sybil user sends sensing reports with a large
number of different user identities to change the sensing result
made by the majority-based MCS server [1].
Privacy leakage: MCS servers at the cloud have to pro-
tect user privacy especially the user locations and personal
information. Rogue users who are curious about the privacy
information and steal sensing data from transmission processes
or cloud resources, significantly discourage other mobile users
from participating in the MCS tasks.
Faked sensing attacks: Selfish mobile users sometimes
submit under-sensing or faked sensing reports to save sensing
efforts and protect privacy [6].
Malwares: Malwares such as viruses, worms and spy tools
seriously threaten MCS with the privacy leakage, economic
loss, and network performance degradation [5]. Mobile users
with limited power and computing capacity are vulnerable to
malwares.
Jamming: A jammer injects faked or replay signals to
interrupt the ongoing transmission of the sensing data and
payments between mobile users and the MCS servers. A smart
jammer can flexibly change the jamming power and frequency
according to the transmission status.
DoS: As a typical type of flood attacks, DoS attackers
aim to interrupt the MCS services by exhausting MCS server
resources [1].
Advanced persistent threat (APT): APT attackers launch
sophisticated, stealthy, continuous and targeted attacks to steal
privacy information from MCS systems over an extended
period of time, causing privacy leakage in MCS networks.
Smart attacks: By applying smart radio devices such as
universal software radio peripherals (USRPs), an attack can
use machine learning techniques to investigate the defense
policy and choose attack policy accordingly.
DL-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Authentication verifies the identity of mobile users partici-
pated in the MCS tasks to address spoofing and Sybil attacks
and protect data privacy for MCS users [4], [13]. The PHY-
layer authentication scheme in [14] designs a hypothesis test to
compare the radio channel responses of the transmitter under
test with the channel record of the claimed node based on a
test threshold that is determined by the given radio channel
model and the network model. However, it is challenging
to determine the test threshold in time-variant MCS systems
with a large number of mobile and heterogeneous devices.
Therefore, the DNN-based authentication scheme is developed
by [4] without requiring the test threshold.
As illustrated in TABLE I, this authentication scheme
captures the unique physical features of WiFi signals in the
daily activities of mobile users to identify mobile users with
the DNN method and develop the support vector machine
(SVM) with the generated DNN abstractions to detect spoofing
attacks. More specifically, the system extracts 6 time domain
features, such as maximum, minimum and skewness, and
3 frequency domain features, including spectrogram energy,
percentile frequency component and spectrogram energy dif-
ference, from both the amplitude and the phase of the channel
responses of WiFi signals. A three-layer DNN based on
autoencoder provides the high-level abstractions of human
physiological characteristics such as the body shape, height
and weight, and the behavioral characteristics such as the
walking patterns of the mobile users.
According to the simulation results as shown in [4], the
performance of the DNN-based authentication scheme can
accurately detect spoofing attacks in typical scenarios. For
example, the average accuracy of the scheme is 91.2% for
7 users with a standard deviation of 3.67% in the office
environment. However, this authentication scheme relies on
the tedious and time consuming feature and attribute selection,
making it difficult to be applied in practical MCS systems.
To accelerate the MCS authentication process, a spoofing
detection system in [7] applies the SAE to capture the features
with a neural network (NN) consisting of multiple layers
of sparse autoencoders. The first layer learns the first order
features from the network traffic, while the following layers
learn the features corresponding to the patterns from the
previous order features. The first hidden layer in the SAE
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE DL-BASEDMCS SECURITY METHODS
Secure MCS techniques Approaches DL techniques
Authentication
Spoofing detection based on network traffic
User authentication through daily activities
SAE [7]
DNN [4]
Privacy protection
Privacy-preserving mechanisms
Data anonymization
Image classification based on privacy constraints
DNN [8]
CNN [9]
CNN [10]
Faked sensing countermeasure Payment policy based on sensing accuracy DQN [6]
Intrusion detection
Content-based malicious communication detection
Malware detection with offloading
RNN [11]
DQN [5]
Jamming countermeasure
Anti-jamming communication
Cache-enabled anti-jamming interference alignment
DQN [3]
DQN [12]
consists of 256 neurons, the second hidden layer has 128
neurons and the third hidden layer contains 64 neurons. By
using the parametric rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation
function, the 3-hidden-layer SAE-based authentication scheme
achieves accurate and balanced classifications for legitimate
mobile users from flooding, injection and spoofing attackers.
For example, this SAE-based authentication scheme achieves
the spoofing detection accuracy of 98.5%, which is 14 times
higher than the J48-based authentication algorithm with the
spoofing detection accuracy of 6.4%.
DL-BASED PRIVACY PROTECTION
Privacy protection for sensing report transmission and stor-
age at cloud servers is essential for practical MCS systems.
Data anonymization methods, such as k-anonymity, l-diversity
and t-closeness [2], provide anonymous quasi-identifiers and
protect sensitive information in database for MCS. However,
the sensing reports containing high-dimensional data streams
such as images and videos, cannot be satisfied with such
traditional data anonymization schemes, due to the difficulty
defining the quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes.
Therefore, a DNN-based flexible framework as proposed
in [9] uses DNN training at the mobile devices to provide
with the data privacy protection. This scheme consists of the
local NN platform that extracts features and the NN at the
cloud server that applies the released features to train the
given MCS task. The local NN that consists of 4 convolutional
layers and 2 max-pooling layers provides data anonymization
for MCS systems. The trade-off between user privacy and
sensing accuracy depends on the number of DNN layers and
the output channel depth. Simulation results provided in [9]
show that the privacy level and the utility of the DNN-based
MCS system decrease with the number of layers and increase
with the output depth in this framework.
On the other hand, as the feature extraction network (FEN)
in [9] depends on the pre-trained NNs in local platform,
attackers can predict the structure and weights of the NN in
the MSC system. Therefore, a pool of pre-trained NNs enables
FEN derivation from different pre-trained NNs to protect
the MCS user anonymity. In addition, the channel selection
process consisting of the output channels and intermediate
channels selection is hard to be known and copied by attackers.
A CNN-based distributed framework as developed in [10]
uses the siamese network that is widely used by verification
applications to optimize the cost function consisting of the
data privacy and sensing task accuracy, and applies the CNN
to improve the image classification accuracy at MCS servers.
In this framework, a feature extractor at the mobile device
and image classifier at the MCS server cooperate to perform
the MCS tasks, such as emotion detection. Because only
convolutional layers are implemented on the mobile devices,
the memory overhead significantly decreases at the mobile
device and thus both the model initialization time and the
MCS power consumption reduce significantly. By removing
the undesired information from the extracted features at the
mobile device, the framework improves the performance of
the MCS tasks, especially gender classification and emotion
detection, and prevents the user identity leakage due to the
face recognition from the MCS server. For example, the
face recognition accuracy of the CNN-based framework with
siamese network is 2.6%, which is 94.5% lower than that of
the framework without siamese network, while the emotion
detection accuracy only decreases 20%.
The DNN-base privacy protection method as proposed in [8]
applies different levels of Gaussian noise in the training param-
eters to provide differential privacy which reduces the sensing
accuracy as well. To balance the privacy preservation and the
sensing accuracy, a coalition MCS incentive mechanism as
designed in [2] evaluates the user payoff and compares with
a threshold that currently is simply set to be zero. However,
such a test threshold is not always optimal and sometimes even
loses the balance between the privacy protection and sensing
accuracy in dynamic MCS networks. Therefore, deep learning
techniques such as CNN can be applied by the mediator to
achieve the optimal threshold and thus improve the sensing
accuracy and user privacy.
4Fig. 2. DQN-based MCS payment scheme to suppress the faked sensing rate with evaluating sensing quality of the mobile users.
Fig. 3. Performance of the DQN-based dynamic MCS system with 60 mobile users, 2 sensing accuracy levels, 11 feasible payments, and evaluation error
rate of the MCS server 0.1.
DL-BASED FAKED SENSING COUNTERMEASURE
Trust mechanisms previously designed for VANETs and
peer-to-peer networks, such as the anonymous reputation man-
agement mechanism as presented in [14] are not applicable in
MCS with variety of participants and large-scale sensing data
[15], causing long sensing latency and low detection accuracy.
To this end, deep learning can reduce the dimension of the
sensing data set and accelerate the learning speed of MCS.
As shown in Fig. 2, a DQN-based secure MCS system as
proposed in [6] suppresses the faked sensing motivation for
autonomous mobile users in dynamic secure mobile crowd-
sensing games. In this framework, the server first determines
and broadcasts its payment policy to mobile users in the area
of interests. Each mobile device chooses its sensing effort
according to the payment policy and its current battery levels
and receives the payment according to the sensing quality
evaluated by the MCS server. As the MCS payment process
in a dynamic game can be formulated as a Markov decision
process, the MCS server can apply reinforcement learning
(RL) techniques such as Q-learnig to achieve the optimal
MCS policy for the mobile users who might launch faked
sensing attacks, and uses a deep CNN that consists of two
convolutional (Conv) layers and two fully connected (FC)
layers to compress the state space of RL and thus accelerate the
learning process. The CNN parameters are updated according
to the stochastic gradient descent (SGD), which samples a
subset of summand functions at each iteration to reduce the
computational cost.
As shown in Fig. 3, this MCS payment strategy outperforms
the benchmark non-DL scheme with a higher sensing quality, a
lower faked sensing rate and a higher utility of the MCS server.
For instance, the DQN-based MCS payment scheme only takes
2000 time slots to suppress the faked sensing rate to 10%,
which is 50.0% faster than the Q-learning based strategy. The
proposed payment scheme improves the utility of the MCS
server by 96.0% after 200 time slots, compared with the Q-
learning based scheme.
DL-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION
In MCS systems, mobile devices with limited power, com-
puting capacity and wireless bandwidth can use cloud-based
intrusion detection to detect malwares with fast processing
speed, powerful security services and large malware database
[5]. By applying learning techniques such as Bayes network
5and random forest classifiers, the MCS system evaluates the
runtime behaviors of the applications and processes the traces
or logs. However, the malware detection accuracy is sensitive
to the features and attributes, and many existing methods such
as the framework proposed in [1] suffer from a long detection
delay in large-scale networks.
A RNN-based malware detection scheme as developed in
[11] uses RNN to capture the domain and content-based
malware characteristics and determine whether to suspend
the dynamic detection based on the network behavior. As
shown in Fig. 4, the malware detection consists of the feature
extraction, RNN construction and training & classification,
based on the domain and content features such as the IP
address of the source node, the types of files and the number
of bytes. With accurate classification performance especially
to process natural languages, RNN can analyze the latent
functions of malware communications, such as the malware
infection spread and information leakage. Simulation results
show that this scheme saves the detection resources and
accelerates the response speed compared with the benchmark
scheme without deep learning due to the high flexibility of
RNN. The RNN-based malware detection outperforms the
statistics-based malware detection with 67.1% less analysis
time, reducing the number of MCS servers by more than half
for efficient MCS dynamic analysis.
Fig. 4. RNN-based intrusion detection process with 3 steps.
MCS systems can also apply deep learning to optimize the
offloading policies without being aware of the radio channel
model and the APP traces generation model in malware de-
tection. For instance, a cloud-based mobile malware detection
scheme as proposed in [5] applies DQN to determine the
offloading rate of the mobile device. More specifically, the
offloading rate is chosen according to the quality function of
the offloading strategy and the current state that consists of
the current radio bandwidth and the previous offloading rates
of the mobile devices. The Q-function is estimated according
to the CNN, which consists of two Conv layers and two FC
layers. The CNN parameters are updated according to the SGD
method, which minimizes the mean-squared error of the target
values via minibatch and the experience replay techniques.
Simulation results show that the DQN-based scheme applies
the CNN to compress the state space and thus accelerate the
learning speed, thus improving the malware detection accuracy
and saving the detection time compared with the RL-based
benchmark scheme without DL. For instance, the DQN-based
scheme increases the detection accuracy by 24.5%, reduces
the detection delay by 35.3%, and increases the utility of the
mobile device by 31.0%, compared with the Q-learning based
scheme.
DL-BASED ANTI-JAMMING TRANSMISSION
MCS systems have to address jamming attacks and DoS
attacks and improve the transmission efficiency of the sensing
data and the payment decisions with high signal-to-noise-
plus-interference (SINR), low bit error rates (BERs) and low
transmission energy consumptions against jamming. However,
traditional anti-jamming techniques such as frequency hopping
and direct-sequence spread spectrum are not always applicable
in MCS systems with heterogenous and dynamic large-scale
networks, causing the loss of the sensing data and payments,
which discourages mobile users to participate in the sensing
tasks.
A promising solution to address jamming attacks in MCS
systems is the DQN-based two-dimensional anti-jamming
communication system as proposed in [3]. As shown in Fig.
5, this scheme applies frequency hopping to resist jamming
and improve the SINR of the received signals. Deep learning
techniques such as CNN are used to help such MCS system to
balance the sensing & payment transmission quality and the
communication overhead such as the energy consumption and
latency of the channel hopping and user mobility. This scheme
enables a mobile device to achieve the optimal communication
policy according the current transmission state without being
aware of the jamming and interference model and the radio
channel model in MCS systems. The CNN is used to compress
the state space for large scale MCS mobile and heterogeneous
devices and thus accelerate the learning speed and increase
the SINR of the received signals.
Simulation results as provide in [3] show that the DQN-
based anti-jamming communication system has a faster con-
vergence rate and higher SINR than Q-learning. For instance,
this scheme converges to the optimal performance after 1000
time slots, and saves 66.7% of the learning time compared
with the benchmark scheme. The SINR of the DQN-based
communication system is 8.3% higher than Q-learning after
1000 time slots.
DQN has also been used in a cache-enabled anti-jamming
communication scheme as developed in [12] to optimize the
interference alignment and user selection. This scheme pro-
vides user cooperation in the design of the precoding matrices
to resit jamming. Implemented with Google TensorFlow, this
communication systme can work in practical MCS with time-
varying radio channels. By utilizing a target CNN network,
this anti-jamming communication system periodically updates
the values of the Q-network according the outputs of the target
network to address the destabilization problem. The learning
rate and minibatch size of the CNN are discussed regarding
the convergence performance. For example, this scheme has
a faster convergence rate with smaller minibatch size, which
might increases the risks of local optimum. Therefore, appro-
6Fig. 5. DQN-based anti-jamming transmissions with 2 smart jammers and 128 radio channels.
priate minibatch size should be chosen properly before being
implemented in MCS systems.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have reviewed the attack models in MCS
systems and investigated the DL-based authentication, privacy
protection, faked sensing countermeasure, intrusion detection,
and anti-jamming transmissions. The DL-based security tech-
niques are promising to improve the security performance of
the MCS systems. Some important directions for future study
of the DL-based MCS security solutions are suggested below.
Real-time processing: Most existing deep learning based
security schemes such as the DNN-based authentication in
[4] and the RNN-based malware detection in [11] require
long training time and are too complicated to be implemented
in the practical MCS systems for real-time processing. The
widely used hardware for deep learning computation such as
graphics processing units (GPUs), is not applicable for most
mobile devices such as smartphones in MCS systems. There-
fore, distributed deep learning algorithms that distribute the
processing and storage tasks among MCS network components
and the low-cost DL compatible chips are critical to protect
MCS systems in the future. Another interesting topic is to
optimize the deep learning architecture and parameters for
MCS security solutions, such as the second order stochastic
gradient descent that helps accelerate the sensing speed for
MCS systems against attacks.
Accurate evaluation of utility: Deep learning based secu-
rity schemes such as the CNN-based sensing data anonymiza-
tion in [9] and the DQN-based faked sensing countermeasure
in [6] have to evaluate the security performance according
to the utility function, which depends on the instant security
gain and protection cost. For example, an MCS server has to
estimate the sensing accuracy, computation cost and protection
cost in each time slot to decide the payment policy and
suppress the faked sensing motivations of mobile users in the
DQN-based MCS system in [6]. However, it is challenging for
the MCS system to accurately evaluate such factors and deter-
mine the utility in time, especially for the case with stealthy
and insider attackers. In the future we have to investigate the
deep learning algorithms that are robust against the utility
evaluation errors to design the MCS security solutions.
Backup security solutions: Existing DL techniques, such
as the DQN-based malware detection with offloading in [5],
require a long training stage and trial-and-error stage at the
beginning, indicating MCS security failures against attacks,
which sometimes causes network disasters and millions of
dollars loss. Therefore, backup security protocols have to be
incorporated with the DL-based security schemes to provide
reliable and secure MCS services.
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